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NOTES
Conchsion
At this point it is apparent that virtually no situation involving
the application of Section 53 of the Civil Practice Act is free from
indecision and conflict. The enactment of a statute of limitations
covering actions in equity and supplementing the traditional doctrine
of laches has as its aim the establishment of uniformity and conse-
quent predictability.63 It is submitted that the legislature's failure to
define adequately the boundaries of operation of Section 53 and its
further delinquency in failing to indicate clearly the time when the
statute will be set in motion, as it has done with regard to the "legal"
statutes of limitation," has resulted in greater disunity and unpre-
dictability than had formerly existed when laches exercised exclusive
control.
LIABILITY OF AN AGENT SIGNING A NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT
IN NEv YORK
Introduction
The liability of an undisclosed principal is well settled under
ordinary rules of agency.' However, the exception to this rule lies
in the field of negotiable instruments. 2 No one may be charged on a
negotiable instrument unless his name appears thereon.3 Neverthe-
less, one may lawfully authorize another to sign 4 as maker, acceptor
or indorser and this delegation of authority may be established as in
other cases of agency. 5 Therefore, it follows that such authority may
63 The propriety of this aim has, nevertheless, been seriously questioned.
See Finkelstein and Bergman, Limitations of Actmis in Equity in New York,
5 ST. JO Hx'S L. Rxv. 199, 211 (1931).
64 See, e.g., N. Y. Crv. PRAc. AcT §§ 15, 48, 49.
1 See Kayton v. Barnett, 116 N. Y. 625, 23 N. E. 24 (1889).
2 See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Martindale, 75 Kan. 142, 88 Pac. 559
(1907).3 NEGOIABLE INsThUmENTs LAW § 18; N. Y. NEG. INsT. LAW § 37. "No
person is liable on the instrument whose signature does not appear thereon ....
But one who signs in a trade or assumed name will be liable to the same extent
as if he had signed his own name."
4 N. Y. GEN. CoNsT. LAW § 46. "The term signature includes any memo-
randum, mark or sign, written, printed, stamped, photographed, engraved or
otherwise placed upon any instrument or writing with intent to execute or
authenticate such instrument or writing."
5 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTs LAW § 19; N. Y. NEG. INST. LAW § 38.
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be oral or written,0 express or implied,7 and an unauthorized signa-
ture may be ratified 8 or a principal may be estopped from denying
the agent's lack of authority.9
Unauthorized Signatures
Section 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Law provides that
"[w]here the instrument contains or a person adds to his signature
words indicating that he signs for or on behalf of a principal, or in a
representative capacity, he is not liable on the instrument if he was
duly authorized ... ." 10 A number of very early New York decisions
imposed personal liability upon an agent who signed the instrument
without authority."1 Later the rule was changed to accord with the
majority view under the law merchant that the holder's remedy was
limited to an action for damages for breach of implied warranty of
authority.12 New York once again reversed its position in 1928,
when the Court of Appeals, interpreting Section 20 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law in the case of New Georgia National Bank v. Lipp-
mann,'8 held the agent personally liable on the instrument.
Authorized Signatures
Although the foregoing is now settled law, the controversial
problem still exists of determining the form necessary to indicate that
6Written authority, however, is required in Kentucky and South Dakota.
See BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUmENTS LAW 408 (Beutel's ed. 1948). How-
ever, the agent's authority must be in writing where the transaction concerns
itself with the creation, grant or assignment of any interest in land. See N. Y.
REAL PRop. LAW § 242.
7 See Keyes v. Metropolitan Trust Co., 220 N. Y. 237, 115 N. E. 455(1917) (express authority); Guaranty Trust Co. v. Manhattan Co., 183 App.
Div. 586, 170 N. Y. Supp. 81 (Ist Dep't 1918) (implied authority); Collins
v. Widger, 231 App. Div. 321, 248 N. Y. Supp. 133 (3d Dep't 1931) (implied
authority).8 Rumsey v. Briggs, 139 N. Y. 323, 34 N. E. 929 (1893).
9 See Dodds v. McColgan, 222 App. Div. 126, 225 N. Y. Supp. 609 (1st
Dep't 1927); see Bank of Monongahela Valley v. Weston, 172 N. Y. 259, 265,
64 N. E. 946, 948 (1902).
10 (emphasis added). Where the signature is made without authority or
if the name of the principal is forged, there is no right of enforcement regard-
less of whose hands it falls into and the instrument is wholly inoperative unless
the principal is estopped from setting up this want of authority. NEGOnABLE
INsTRUmENTs LAW § 23; N. Y. NEG. INST. LAW § 42.
11 Dusenbury v. Ellis, 3 Johns. Cas. 70 (N. Y. 1802) ; see White v. Madison,26 N. Y. 117, 122, 123 (1862); Palmer v. Stephens, 1 Denio 471, 480 (N. Y.
1845).12 White v. Madison, supra note 11; Walker v. Bank of N. Y., 13 Barb.
636 (N. Y. 1852) (the court was of the opinion that the fact that he executed
the instrument in the name of another showed that he did not intend to be
personally bound).Is249 N. Y. 307, 164 N. E. 108 (1928).
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the signature was made in a representative capacity, assuming the
agent was duly authorized. Prior to the enactment of the Negotiable
Instruments Law, the respective liabilities of principal and agent were
uncertain 14 due to an adherence to common-law precedents and fail-
ure to recognize commercial custom and usage. This resulted in the
frequent subjugation of the intent of the parties because form (of
the signature) rather than substance dictated the results. Much of
the difficulty has been alleviated by the enactment of the statute, which
relieves the agent or representative of personal liability if the instru-
ment contains or the signer adds words to indicate his representative
character, and if he discloses his principal. A few examples will serve
to illustrate and point up this problem that has constantly plagued the
courts:
(1) How may one sign as agent for another to avoid any pos-
sibility of personal liability? The ideal way is exemplified by the
signature, "Acme Shoe Corp., by John Smith, Agent," and no one
could seriously contend that this is the agent's obligation.15 The
variants of this type of signature fall within the ambit of two ex-
tremes; where, in the above signature, the word "by" or "for" is
omitted or where the agent merely signs his own name without dis-
closing his principal on the instrument and without adding words of
representation. Although no individual liability would probably re-
sult in New York where the word "by" or "for" is omitted,1 6 it
is interesting to note that such a signature has not been uniformly
construed in other jurisdictions.' 7 However, according to the weight
of authority, the instrument is a corporate obligation, free from any
ambiguity.' 8 Though a corporation is a legal entity, it can only act
through its authorized agents,19 so that a signature embodying merely
14 Green v. Skeel, 2 Hun 485 (N. Y. 1874). "It is difficult to reconcile
the cases, so as to ascertain, with certainty, when a principal is bound by a
writing, executed by a person who signs the same as agent." Id. at 487.
15 See Walker v. N. Y. State Bank, 9 N. Y. 582, 584 (1854).
18 In New Georgia Nat. Bank v. Lippmann, 249 N. Y. 307, 164 N. E. 108
(1928), the defendant signed a note, "J. & G. Lippmann, L. J. Lippmann,
Pres.," and Chief Judge Cardozo, speaking of this type of signature, said:
"Some courts were able to discover ambiguity in a form of signature as un-
equivocal as the one before us here .... The instrument has the same mean-
ing whether there is authority or none. In form it is still by hypothesis the
promise of the principal." Id. at 312, 164 N. E. at 110; see Union Nat. Bank
v. Scott, 53 App. Div. 65, 70, 66 N. Y. Supp. 145, 147 (3d Dep't 1900).
17 See Myers v. Chesley, 190 Mo. App. 371, 177 S. W. 326 (1915) (parol
evidence admitted to exonerate the individual defendants); McCandless v.
Belle Plaine Canning Co., 78 Iowa 161, 42 N. W. 635 (1889) (individual de-
fendants held liable); cf. Bayh v. Hanna, 69 Ind. App. 348, 122 N. E. 7, 8
(1919).
18 Cannon v. Miller Rubber Products Co., 128 Ohio St. 72, 190 N. E. 210
(1934) ; see Saint Joseph Valley Bank v. Napoleon Motors Co., 230 Mich. 498,
202 N. W. 933, 934 (1925).
19 See Bankers' Trust Co. v. International Ry., 207 App. Div. 579, 587,
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the corporate name would admit of little authority.20 Therefore,
when the corporate name is coupled with the signature of an indi-
vidual who is authorized to sign and, in fact, adds words of repre-
sentation, it seems hardly plausible to entertain any doubt as to the
corporate liability merely because the word "by" or "for" was
omitted.21 The majority view seems to be the only reasonable con-
clusion and any other position appears untenable. Since the effect of
such a signature has not been construed uniformly, it is hardly sur-
prising to find discord of opinion where the word "agent" is omitted,
e.g., "Acme Shoe Corp., John Smith." New York, in adopting the
minority view, seems to take cognizance of the fact that a corporation
cannot sign an instrument itself and hence parol evidence to show
that no individual obligation was intended is admissible in an action
between the original parties 22 or by one not a holder in due course.23
The great majority of jurisdictions, however, treat such a signature
as creating an individual liability and importing a clear and unambigu-
ous obligation.24 The problem becomes less troublesome if the prin-
cipal is a natural person, and if the agent signs his own name to-
gether with that of the principal. There is nothing in such a signature
to import an obligation other than that of a co-maker and hence parol
evidence should not be allowed to vary this apparent liability.
25
202 N. Y. Supp. 561, 567, 568 (1st Dep't 1924), aff'd. 239 N. Y. 619, 147 N. E.
220 (1925); Jacobus v. Jamestown Mantel Co., 149 App. Div. 356, 362, 134
N. Y. Supp. 418, 423 (4th Dep't 1912), aff'd, 211 N. Y. 154, 105 N. E. 210
(1914).
2 0 See L. W. Cox & Co. v. Chemical Bank & Trust Co., 175 Misc. 1063,
1066, 26 N. Y. S. 2d 38, 42 (N. Y. City Ct. 1941) (indorsement for deposit).21 See Consumers' Twine & Machinery Co. v. Mt. Pleasant Thermo Tank
Co., 196 Iowa 64, 194 N. W. 290, 294 (1923).
22 Hoffstaedter v. Carlton Auto Supplies Co., 203 App. Div. 494, 196 N. Y.
Supp. 577 (1st Dep't 1922); Dunbar Box & Lumber Co. v. Martin, 53 Misc.
312, 103 N. Y. Supp. 91 (Sup. Ct. 1907) (the court was of the opinion that
the signature created an ambiguity).
23 Central Bank of Rochester v. Gleason, 206 App. Div. 28, 200 N. Y. Supp.
384 (4th Dep't 1923). In Kraushaar v. Lloyd, 152 Misc. 269, 273 N. Y. Supp.
231 (Sup. Ct. 1934), the court held that such evidence was inadmissible where
plaintiff was presumptively a holder in due course. The court was also of the
opinion that, on the face of the instrument, it was the defendant's individual
obligation. Compare this view with that taken by the court in Dunbar Box
& Lumber Co. v. Martin, supra note 22.
24 Murphy v. Reimann Furniture Mfg. Co., 183 Ore. 474, 193 P. 2d 1000
(1948) ; Coal River Collieries v. Eureka Coal & Wood Co., 144 Va. 263, 132
S. E. 337 (1926) ; see Farmers' State Bank of Newport v. Lamon, 132 Wash.
369, 231 Pac. 952, 953 (1926).
25 But see BarrrTN, BiLLs AND NoTEs 785 (1943). The word "person" also
includes an unincorporated body of persons. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUmENTS LAW
§ 191; N. Y. NEa. IxsT. LAW § 2. This provision seenms to cover unincor-
porated associations, trusts, and businesses, and as an association of this type
must necessarily act through its representative, parol evidence should be admis-
sible to explain a signature standing alone under the name of the association.
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(2) Though a mere variation of the aforementioned examples,
the signature, "John Smith, Agent, Acme Shoe Corp.," has caused
conflicting views both in New York 26 and in numerous other jur-
isdictions. It has been remarked that a similar signature is only de-
scriptive of the individual signer and he is held personally liable,27
or that the signer was prima facie liable but that parol evidence would
be competent to rebut the presumption. 28  The sounder and more
reasonable view is that a corporate obligation has been created.2
(3) The signature, "John Smith, Agent," combined with a dis-
closure of the principal's name somewhere on the face of the instru-
ment but not in the body, presents another variant of the problem.
Prior to the enactment of the Negotiable Instruments Law, New York
courts had adopted the view that where one affixed his name to an
instrument, adding his official title with the name of the company
stamped only in the margin, a solely individual obligation was
created,3 0 although it seems that such an instrument would be suffi-
cient to put a reasonable man on inquiry.3 1 In Chatham National
Bank v. Gardner,3 2 a leading Pennsylvania case, the court approached
the problem realistically and held that a firm obligation was created
where two partners signed their names, adding their titles, and where
the name of the copartnership appeared at the top of the instrument.
The New York decisions holding that individual liability was created
in such a case now appear archaic 33 by reason of the test laid down
by Chief Judge Cardozo in the New Georgia National Bank case:
"Whenever the form of the paper is such as fairly to indicate to the
26 Compare Moss v. Livingston, 4 N. Y. 208 (1850), and Haight v. Naylor,
5 Daly 219 (N., Y. 1874), with Thompson v. Tioga R. R., 36 Barb. 79 (N. Y.
1861).
27 Cf. Sandmann v. Getty, 254 Ky. 496, 71 S. W. 2d 954 (1934).
28 See Reeve v. First Nat. Bank of Glassboro, 54 N. J. L. 208, 23 At. 853,
854 (1892).
29 Citizens' Nat. Bank v. Ariss, 68 Wash. 448, 123 Pac. 593 (1912); see
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-403(2) (Official Draft 1952).
30 First Nat. Bank v. Wallis, 80 Hun 435, 30 N. Y. Supp. 83 (Sup. Ct.
1894), aff'd, 150 N. Y. 455, 44 N. E. 1038 (1896) ; Casco Nat. Bank v. Clark,
64 Hun 634, 18 N. Y. Supp. 887 (Sup. Ct. 1892), aff'd, 139 N. Y. 307, 34 N. E.
908 (1893); Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Clark, 64 Hun 175, 19 N. Y. Supp. 136
(Sup. Ct. 1892), aff'd, 139 N. Y. 314, 34 N. E. 910 (1893).
31 See Second Nat. Bank of Akron v. Midland Steel Co., 155 Ind. 581,
58 N. E. 833, 836 (1900).
3231 Pa. Super. Ct. 135 (1906).
33 But in Werner v. Emerson Hotel & Restaurant Co., 192 N. Y. Supp.
273 (Sup. Ct. 1922), an action was brought on a check signed "I. Blumen-
krantz, Pres.," and at the left-hand margin of the check appeared the words
"I. Blumenkrantz, Emerson Restaurant & Hotel Company, Inc." The defen-
dant was held individually liable. Though the decision was prior to Chief
Judge Cardozo's test of the "eye of common sense," it still seems the court
had not yet, twenty-five years after the adoption of the Negotiable Instruments
Law, taken into account the manner in which an ordinary businessman would
have regarded the instrument.
1953] NOTES
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
eye of common sense that the maker signs as agent or in a repre-
sentative capacity, he is relieved of personal liability if duly author-
ized. . . ., 34 Courts have been found to make distinctions in cases
where the ordinary businessman would not have been troubled for a
moment. It is submitted that the mere degrees of emphasis which
dictated the results in previous decisions have now been done away
with in New York. Liability is to be predicated upon a construction
of the instrument from its four corners and in the light of commercial
usage and custom, not merely because of an irregularity of the signa-
ture. The construction of the instrument is a question for the court
and not for the jury and the test remains constant whether a payee,
holder or holder in due course is involved. This test is consistent
with the statute which merely requires a disclosure of the principal
but does not specify at what place the principal must be revealed on
the instrument. It should make no difference whether the principal
be disclosed at the top, in the body or on the margin of the instru-
ment. A construction of the instrument through the eyes of an ordi-
nary businessman will invariably give effect to the real intention of
the parties instead of imposing undue and burdensome liability where
neither party intended such a result.
(4) Where negotiable paper is signed "John Smith, Agent,"
with no further indication of the principal's name on the face of the
instrument, no problem would have arisen under the law merchant.
If a bona fide holder was involved in such a case, it was conceded that
individual liability was intended, and the holder was protected from
any hidden equities; 35 the addendum to the signature was treated as
words of descriptio personae and regarded as mere surplusage.
The Negotiable Instruments Law requires one to sign in a repre-
sentative capacity and to disclose his principal if he wishes to avoid
personal liability. A leading New York decision, Megowan v. Peter-
son,s 6 reiterated the rule which existed under the law merchant and
remarked that the statute did not require a disclosure of the principal
on the face of the instrument where the transaction did not concern
a holder in due course.37 In that specific case the defendant signed
31249 N. Y. 307, 311, 164 N. E. 108, 109 (1928).
35 Manufacturers and Traders' Bank v. Love, 13 App. Div. 561, 43 N. Y.
Supp. 812 (4th Dep't 1897). "The law merchant surrounds the negotiable
paper in the hands of a bona fide holder with a credit not given to other con-
tracts, and protects him against hidden equities of which he has no notice, and
permits him to recover against the party whose name is signed to the instru-
ment though there be attached to his name the word 'Agent'. ... The rights
of the holder are confined to the parties to the instrument . . . ." Id. at 564,
43 N. Y. Supp. at 814. But see First Nat. Bank v. Wallis, 150 N. Y. 455,
458, 44 N. E. 1038 (1896).
36 173 N. Y. 1, 65 N. E. 738 (1902).
37 "It is contended on behalf of the plaintiffs that his representative char-
acter must be disclosed upon the face of the note. This may be so insofar
as innocent purchasers for value are concerned, but as to the payees named
[ VOL. 27
the instrument "Charles G. Peterson, Trustee." The court held that
it was error to direct a verdict for the defendant, inasmuch as the
plaintiff had denied the oral disclosure, and hence there was a ques-
tion of fact for the jury. This doctrine permitting the introduction
of parol evidence under these circumstances is followed in many other
jurisdictions.38 The theory on which the doctrine stands is that the
holder need not be apprised of knowledge which he already has.39
According to the most approved authorities it is held that parol evi-
dence is inadmissible to negate the agent's liability where suit is
brought by a, holder in due course.40  In such a case it is necessary
that the name of the principal be disclosed on the face of the instru-
ment.41 The result is predicated on the theory that the mere addi-
tion of a word describing the signer is not sufficient to put a subse-
quent holder on notice of the agency, but by the same token, a payee
or holder with actual knowledge of the agency will not be allowed
to take advantage of the non-disclosure on the instrument so as to
work an injustice on the agent.
(5) The other extreme referred to in the introduction appears
where one merely signs "John Smith," with no words added to indi-
cate that the signing was made in a representative capacity and with-
out a disclosure of the principal's identity on the face of the instru-
ment. There can be no doubt that such a signature imports an
individual obligation only and parol evidence to contradict this fact
is inadmissible even if the payee or holder received the instrument
with knowledge that no personal liability was intended. 42  However,
in 1950, the Syracuse Municipal Court, in Azzarello v. Richards,43
cast some doubt on this seemingly well-settled point of New York
law by allowing the introduction of parol evidence in such a situation
to establish the payee's knowledge. This decision carried the doc-
trine of Megowan v. Peterson beyond reasonable bounds. 44 This lat-
ter doctrine is neither excessively harsh nor unreasonable as it gives
in the note we think a different rule prevails." Megowan v. Peterson, supra
note 36, at 5, 65 N. E. at 739; see Schmittler v. Simon, 114 N. Y. 176, 187, 21
N. E. 162, 164 (1889).
38 See Note, 113 A. L. R. 1360 (1938) (cases collected therein).
39 See Kerby v. Ruegamer, 107 App. Div. 491, 497, 498, 95 N. Y. Supp. 408,
412 (2d Dep't 1905).
40 See BRrrrox, BILLS AND NoTXs 788 (1943); 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§2444(6) (3d ed. 1940) (extrinsic agreements are effective only against the
parties assenting to them and not against a holder in due course). But see
Phelps v. Weber, 84 N. J. L. 630, 87 Atl. 469, 471 (1913).
41 See Megowan v. Peterson, 173 N. Y. 1, 5 65 N. E. 738, 739 (1902).
42 Scantlebury v. Tallcott, 84 Misc. 400, 143 N. Y. Supp. 184 (Sup. Ct.),
application denied, 163 App. Div. 888, 147 N. Y. Supp. 1139 (1st Dep't 1914).
43 198 Misc. 723, 99 N. Y. S. 2d 597 (Syracuse Munic. Ct. 1950).
44 See Re, Negotiable Instruments in Some Effects of the Uniform Con-
inercial Code on New York Law-A Symposium, 26 ST. JoIIN's L. REv. 26,
63 n. 187 (1951).
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effect to the intention of the parties, and prevents the payee or holder
with notice from perpetrating a fraud on the signer who has not dis-
closed his principal on the instrument. The Negotiable Instruments
Law should be effective in declaring only prima facie liability, which
becomes conclusive only when the instrument comes into the hands
of a holder in due course. The Megowan doctrine seems at variance
with the parol evidence rule, as such evidence would seem to change
the effect of the instrument, 45 and it has been repudiated by the Re-
statement of the Law of Agency 46 and the proposed Uniform Com-
mercial Code,47 inasmuch as both rules require a disclosure of the
principal's identity on the face of the instrument. The danger of the
doctrine lies in its use as the springboard for decisions such as
Azzarello v. Richards. In that case the defendant was employed as
a bookkeeper by her father who kept his funds in a checking account
under her name. She signed a postdated check for services rendered
to her father, designating the plaintiff as payee, but added no words
on the check to indicate any agency whatsoever. The drawee bank
refused payment for insufficient funds and the plaintiff brought suit
against the defendant in her individual capacity. The court allowed
parol evidence to show that the plaintiff knew this to be the usual
way in which the father paid his bills and hence the defendant was
relieved of personal liability on the instrument. Thus the court took
a stand opposed to the weight of decisional law in New York 48
and other jurisdictions. 49
Conclusion
Under the particular fact situation, the Azzarello decision arrives
at a just and equitable result, but more must be considered. There
are three questions which present themselves. How did the court
circumvent the applicable section of the Negotiable Instruments Law
45 See Azzarello v. Richards, supra note 43, at 726, 99 N. Y. S. 2d at 601.
But see Bush v. Gilmore, 45 App. Div. 89, 91, 61 N. Y. Supp. 682, 683 (3d
Dep't 1899).
46 REsTATEmENT, AGENCY § 324(3) (1933). "If the name of the principal
appears upon a negotiable instrument and the agent does not appear unambigu-
ously as a party, extrinsic evidence of an understanding that the agent shall
not be a party to it is admissible as against any holder of the instrument who
has notice of the agreement or who is not a holder in due'course."4 7 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-403(2) (Official Draft 1952). "An au-
thorized representative who signs his own name to an instrument is also per-
sonally obligated unless the instrument names the person represented and shows
that the signature is made in a representative capacity."
48 Purgold v. Hachtmann & Co., 201 N. Y. Supp. 76 (Sup. Ct. 1922);
Scantlebury v. Tallcott, 84 Misc. 400, 146 N. Y. Supp. 184 (Sup. Ct. 1914);
Phelps v. Borland, 30 Hun 362 (N. Y. 1883).
49 United Drug Co. v. Bedell, 145 Ark. 96, 223 S. W. 372 (1920) ; see Clark
v. Talbott, 72 W. Va. 46, 77 S. E. 523, 524-25 (1913) ; Crocker Nat. Bank of
San Francisco v. Say, 209 Cal. 436, 288 Pac. 69, 71 (1930).
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which requires the instrument itself to contain, or a person to add
to his signature, words indicating that he is acting for another? Was
the court correct in its interpretation, and finally, what could be the
consequences of such a rule? In answer to the first question, the
court, in the instant case, did not apply the appropriate provision of
the Negotiable Instruments Law as it exists, but rather applied the
interpretation given it by the case of Megowan v. Peterson. It will
be remembered that, in the latter case, the defendant signed the in-
strument, "Charles G. Peterson, Trustee" and, in the course of the
opinion, the court said that where a bona fide holder of the instru-
ment was not involved, the "representative character" of the signer
need not be disclosed on the face of the note. The defendant de-
scribed himself as trustee and yet the court was of the opinion that
his representative character had not been disclosed. Thus, the infer-
ence is inescapable that the term "representative character" refers
to the name of the principal and not to a mere word of description
placed after the defendant's signature. For this reason alone, the
test of the Megowan case is inapplicable to the factual situation of
the Azzarello case where no words of any agency whatsoever were
present on the instrument. A conclusion that one may sign as an
apparent maker without some evidence of the agency on the face of
the note and thereafter introduce parol evidence to escape personal
liability is unwarranted. Any other result would be inconsistent with
the express mandates of the statute. "There is no indication on the
note in suit that the defendants signed in any representative capacity.
Hence, the provisions of Section 20 of the Negotiable Instruments
Act [Section 39 of the New York statute] . . . do not apply, and the
authorities construing that section are not applicable." 50
The court also cites the opinion in the Megowan case, which al-
ludes to the common-law rule allowing evidence of the conditions
under which the note was delivered in an action between the orig-
inal parties or a holder with notice. The cases cited in support of
this proposition deal with situations wherein a written paper was de-
livered subject to a condition. The cases proceed on the theory that
until such condition occurs or is performed, there is no contract, and
parol evidence may always be introduced to show the non-existence
of the obligation. The Azzarello decision speaks of these conditions
as the circumstances attending the delivery of the check. There is
no evidence of any conditional delivery as such in the instant case
but merely knowledge on the plaintiff's part that the defendant was
acting for her father. This knowledge cannot be tortured into a con-
ditional delivery and, at most, is evidence of the circumstances under
which the instrument was delivered. Similar cases have recognized
the admissibility of parol evidence, but in all those instances there
50 Baird v. Publishers' Nat. Service Bureau, 51 N. D. 374, 199 N. W. 757,
760 (1924).
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was, at least, some evidence of an agency on the face of the instru-
ment.51 It is submitted that the court indulged in an unwarranted
circumvention of the statute.
Lastly, what might be the consequences of such a rule, if fol-
lowed? There is no doubt that the decision defies the very wording
of the statute which requires words of representation to appear on
the instrument itself. The procedure of the Azzarello case, if followed,
may have the effect of rendering the applicable provision of the Nego-
tiable Instruments Law wholly nugatory; the statute itself, and not
its previous interpretation, must be applied. Such a rule would doubt-
less have its effect on the transferability of negotiable paper, since the
sine qua non of negotiability is certainty in all respects, which requires
the maximum amount of freedom from the uncertainties of extrinsic
evidence. Regardless of the holder's knowledge, one placing his or
her signature on an instrument in such an unequivocal manner must
be held to intend the legal consequences of such an act, and it should
be no defense that the signer maintains an erroneous belief as to the
legal effect of such a signature. A holder could not be certain that
payment would be forthcoming on an instrument though, on its face,
it admits of clear and unambiguous liability. Lengthy and expensive
litigation is not to be considered as a mere remote possibility, and
the chance of ultimately escaping liability would be incentive enough
to unscrupulous persons to introduce perjured testimony to contradict
the holder's averments of good faith. In effect, the purchaser of the
instrument would be buying a lawsuit. If the "eye of common sense"
is to be used to relieve the agent of personal liability, it should also
serve as a guide to a holder where no other construction is possible
from the face of the instrument. It is submitted that a closer adher-
ence to statutory mandates is required to establish the necessary de-
gree of certainty which must attach to transactions involving nego-
tiable instruments.
RIGHTS OF BONA FIDE PURCHASER FROM APPARENT DEVISEE
OR DISTRIBUTEE
Introduction
Once real property has been removed from the public domain,
and title thereto has been vested in an individual, there must at all
times be someone in whom title to that property is vested. This con-
5x See Azzarello v. Richards, 198 Misc. 723, 99 N. Y. S. 2d 597 (Syracuse
Munic. Ct. 1950) (cases cited therein).
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